Targeting anticorruption interventions at the frontline:  developmental governance in health systems by Hutchinson, Eleanor et al.
 1Hutchinson E, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003092. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003092
Targeting anticorruption interventions 
at the front line: developmental 
governance in health systems
Eleanor Hutchinson,1 Nahitun Naher,2 Pallavi Roy,3 Martin McKee   ,4 
Susannah H Mayhew,1 Syed Masud Ahmed,2 Dina Balabanova1
Analysis
To cite: Hutchinson E, 
Naher N, Roy P, et al. Targeting 
anticorruption interventions at 
the front line: developmental 
governance in health 
systems. BMJ Global Health 
2020;5:e003092. doi:10.1136/
bmjgh-2020-003092
Handling editor Stephanie M 
Topp
Received 17 June 2020
Revised 30 September 2020
Accepted 6 October 2020
1Department of Global Health 
and Development, Faculty of 
Public Health and Policy, London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical 
Medicine, London, UK
2Centre of Excellence for 
Universal Health Coverage at 
Centre for Equity and Health 
Systems, James P. Grant School 
of Public Health, Brac University, 
Dhaka, Bangladesh
3Centre for International Studies 
and Diplomacy, Department 
of Politics and International 
Studies, SOAS University of 
London, London, UK
4Department of Health Services 
Research and Policy, London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine Faculty of Public 
Health and Policy, London, UK
Correspondence to
Dr Eleanor Hutchinson;  
 eleanor. hutchinson@ lshtm. ac. uk
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2020. Re- use 
permitted under CC BY- NC. No 
commercial re- use. See rights 
and permissions. Published by 
BMJ.
ABSTRACT
In 2008, Vian reported an increasing interest in 
understanding how corruption affects healthcare outcomes 
and asked what could be done to combat corruption in 
the health sector. Eleven years later, corruption is seen as 
a heterogeneous mix of activity, extensive and expensive 
in terms of loss of productivity, increasing inequity and 
costs, but with few examples of programmes that have 
successfully tackled corruption in low- income or middle- 
income countries. The commitment, by multilateral 
organisations and many governments to the Sustainable 
Development Goals and Universal Health Coverage has 
renewed an interest to find ways to tackle corruption 
within health systems. These efforts must, however, begin 
with a critical assessment of the existing theoretical 
models and approaches that have underpinned action 
in the health sector in the past and an assessment of 
the potential of innovations from anticorruption work 
developed in sectors other than health. To that end, this 
paper maps the key debates and theoretical frameworks 
that have dominated research on corruption in health. It 
examines their limitations, the blind spots that they create 
in terms of the questions asked, and the capacity for 
research to take account of contextual factors that drive 
practice. It draws on new work from heterodox economics 
which seeks to target anticorruption interventions at 
practices that have high impact and which are politically 
and economically feasible to address. We consider how 
such approaches can be adopted into health systems and 
what new questions need to be addressed by researchers 
to support the development of sustainable solutions to 
corruption. We present a short case study from Bangladesh 
to show how such an approach reveals new perspectives 
on actors and drivers of corruption practice. We conclude 
by considering the most important areas for research and 
policy.
INTRODUCTION
The critical role of governance in health 
systems strengthening,1 2 achieving Universal 
Health Coverage3 and equitable financing4 
has long been recognised.5 Among health 
systems researchers, this has come with signif-
icant intellectual investment in the develop-
ment of theory and methods,3 6 reflected in 
findings from a recent review which identi-
fied 17 governance frameworks used in health 
systems research.7 Theoretical development 
has been followed by considerable empirical 
work, with analysts moving beyond examina-
tions of governance as a normative goal to 
descriptions of how people make and apply 
rules across the health system.8–10 This shift 
in focus has provided intellectual space for a 
more nuanced understanding of the forma-
tion and application of rules in different 
settings. Under the rubric of ‘everyday 
governance’ an analysis of ‘practical norms’11 
has explored informal rules and norms 
that emerge as health workers and patients 
respond to different aspects of the contexts in 
which services are delivered.3 9 These studies 
have sought to persuade the global health 
community to recognise these informal prac-
tices,4 although agreement on how to manage 
informality when developing formal govern-
ance arrangements has proven elusive.
Corruption and anticorruption fall within 
the field of research on governance but 
our reading indicates that there has been 
less interest in these topics among health 
systems researchers than in other governance 
Summary box
 ► Corruption undermines good quality care.
 ► Anticorruption interventions have failed to yield ef-
fective results.
 ► New approaches to research and policy are called 
for.
 ► The social, political and economic drivers of corrup-
tion must be taken account of in new research and 
policy.
 ► Anticorruption efforts must be targeted at specific 
practices that undermine the health system and can 
be feasibly addressed.
 ► ‘Developmental governance’ and targeted interven-
tions offer a new way to manage informality and 
corruption within health systems.
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concerns (eg, participation, institution building and 
accountability). Often defined as practices by which indi-
viduals and groups exploit public resources for individual 
benefit, corruption in health systems may be ignored for 
various practical, social and political reasons.12–15 Not all 
forms of informality are corrupt, and some practices are 
forms of ‘survival corruption’ offering practical solutions 
to the difficulties of delivering care, especially in severely 
underfunded health systems.14 16–18 Work on corrup-
tion can also be hindered by the fact that it is difficult 
to define.14 19 Early descriptions, ‘the abuse of public 
resources for private gain’ ignored corruption within the 
private sector and failed to provide an explicit acknowl-
edgement of the central role of power in its manifes-
tation.20 More recent definitions, ‘the abuse of power 
for private gain’ enables a focus on both public and 
private sectors but continues to rely on a clear division 
between public and private spheres—a distinction that 
is not always clear or universally recognised.21 This defi-
nition continues to focus excessively on the individual. 
Moreover as Gaitonde argues, the system in which they 
are embedded and the enactment of corruption for the 
benefit of a group, organisation, party or others close to 
the person who is abusing power, is obscured in these 
definitions.19 It also makes it difficult to take account of 
the fact that corruption is socially construct and sits on 
an axis between moral/immoral and legal/illegal activity 
(with some forms recognised as legal but unethical and 
others as illegal but morally defensible).22
Policy- makers have sidestepped these debates by iden-
tifying actions or offences that can commonly be agreed 
on as corrupt (United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption 2003). In the health sector, these include 
theft (of money, medicines and consumables); demands 
for informal payments or bribes; absenteeism among 
staff; inappropriate referral and diversion of patients 
from public to private facilities; and inappropriate 
prescribing (often under pressure from pharmaceutical 
firms) and provision of misinformation19 23 Each of these 
is likely to significantly challenge the central goals of 
health systems—the realisation of the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health and financial protection.24 
Recognition of the threat that corruption poses to the 
realisation of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3 
(Ensure healthy lives and promote well- being for all at all 
ages) and SDG16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive soci-
eties) has driven recent efforts by multilateral and inter-
national organisations and some governments.25 The 
World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Fund and 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have 
proposed a Global Network on Anti- Corruption, Trans-
parency and Accountability.26 Their work is, however, 
significantly undermined by a lack of data on effective 
strategies and solutions (even on a pilot basis) that have 
been tested in high, middle or low- income settings.19 27–29 
Gaitonde’ striking conclusion in a 2016 Cochrane review 
states that there is ‘a paucity of evidence regarding how 
best to reduce corruption in any (ie, in high, middle or 
low- income) setting’.19 A Transparency International 
report suggests that many of the current anticorruption 
approaches within health are either ineffectual or ad hoc 
or both.30
This paper examines the potential for a new direction 
in anticorruption research and practice within health 
systems. It draws on the governance literature and in 
particular the idea of ‘developmental governance’. This 
approach is distinct from the dominant liberal approach 
to governance known as ‘good governance’ that has been 
advocated primarily by the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. The good governance framework 
is heavily influenced by free- market economics, pays scant 
attention to historical change and is deeply problematic 
in its reliance on norms and benchmarks drawn from the 
features of (mostly) western, capitalist economies. Devel-
opmental governance, on the other hand, comes from 
heterodox political economy and uses a historical insti-
tutionalist approach to understand conflictual political 
processes of economic change. It examines the structural 
nature of informality and corruption as a feature of the 
economy and social relations, rather than something 
that has emerges from social norms and culture. Unlike 
the good governance framework, its concern is not with 
transforming whole societies but rather it focuses on 
anticorruption measures as central to tackling specific 
informal practices that are detrimental to development 
(the efficiency of the economy and the equitable distri-
bution of high- quality services). It is known as ‘develop-
mental governance’ because the framework demands 
that any intervention explicitly couple governance goals 
with identified development goals. It is particularly salient 
for the present discourse on decolonising public health 
because it is rooted in a rereading of history that explic-
itly recognises how colonialism has affected governance.
Anticorruption research has only recently started to 
draw on this framework, it has been used by researchers 
in Bangladesh to identify a strategy to tackle fraud in the 
skills training sector by improving organisational capa-
bility the demand for skilled workers31 and in Nigeria 
to make changes in the electricity sector.32 Anticorrup-
tion researchers from Nigeria, Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and Tanzania have also started to use this framework for 
anticorruption work in the health sector,23 33–36 but its 
theoretical implications for health systems have yet to be 
presented in detail. This paper seeks to add to the litera-
ture by settings out the theoretical and practice changes 
that a developmental governance approach to anticor-
ruption work in health. Our case study focuses on front- 
line staff, in part responding to research that shows that 
clinics and health centres in many countries are domi-
nated by informal practice3 and that policy- makers need 
frameworks and guidance on how to manage and when 
to act on this informality.
We are cognisant and supportive of the call for decolo-
niality within global health. This paper is the result of a 
long partnership between South- North institutions and 
is one of several papers to be published collectively. It 
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has explicitly sought to present a theoretical framework 
that challenges ideas of improvements in governance as a 
northern- focused benchmarking process. The paper has 
three sections. First, it traces the history of corruption 
research in international/global health. It shows how 
dominant theoretical frameworks have largely ignored 
key contextual factors, namely political power, social 
networks and everyday forms of informal distribution 
of resources. Following this, it examines the potential of 
innovative approaches in anticorruption research from 
other sectors for health systems research. Finally, the 
paper presents research on absenteeism among doctors 
in rural Bangladesh to show how a nuanced account 
of the formal and informal structures in which health 
workers operate draws out hitherto unexplored elements 
of informal practice. This detailed knowledge provides 
the canvas on which effective and feasible anticorruption 
strategies can be formulated. We conclude by considering 
the potential impact of these theoretical approaches to 
the field and discuss possible intersections and collabo-
rations between researchers and policy makers around 
these new approaches.
RESEARCH ON CORRUPTION IN HEALTH
Governance research and policy (of which anticor-
ruption work is a subset) has developed through three 
more or less distinct phases.37 38 The first, emerged in 
the late 1980s and 1990s as neoliberal political ortho-
doxies challenged the position of the state as the driving 
force of economic development and provider of services 
in both high- income and low- income settings.38 39 The 
World Bank, with a particular focus on Africa argued 
that the problems of economic development lay with a 
crisis in governance at the national level.40 Although, as 
Mkandawire argues, the term ‘good governance’ had 
originally been devised by African economists wedded 
to developmental, democratic and socially inclusive 
policy- making,34 it was reworked at the World Bank. 
Good governance became a set of narrow and technical 
interventions devised with the explicit aim of protecting 
markets and private sector actors from what was seen as a 
predatory, neopatrimonial state.37 38 40 41 The law, bureau-
cracy and judiciary were critical areas for intervention: 
new legal frameworks and organisational practices that 
would support market economies, uphold the rule of law, 
and tackle rent seeking were established.37 38 40 41
First phase of corruption research in health: principals, 
agents and good governance
Whereas research on corruption initially focused on 
protecting private sector development, interest was then 
extended into governance in the social sectors with a new 
focus on creating more effective and accountable service 
delivery in education and health.38 42 43 Although ideas of 
social accountability were rare within health at the time, 
corruption research across the social sectors instrumen-
talised ideas of social accountability combining them 
with technocratic approaches to formulate anticorrup-
tion tools. An extended set of actors (citizens, civil society 
organisations as well as government authorities) were to 
be mobilised to curb the behaviour of corrupt officials.44 
Many of these interventions were based on assumptions 
that increasing transparency would lead to more account-
ability, which coincided with an interest in promoting 
community participation in critical public services.
It was in this phase that the debates on corruption 
within public health began in earnest and three papers 
were written that came to dominate the field: Savedoff 
and Husemann (2006), Lewis (2006) and Vian (2008). 
In all three, the health sector is identified as having 
particular vulnerabilities—connected to unusually high 
government spending coupled with entrusting private 
providers (individuals and organisations) with important 
public roles. Each drew on ideas of good governance and 
neoclassical economic theory, to which Vian added issues 
of fraud and risk.
Savedoff and Husemann’s chapter in Transparency 
International’s Global Corruption Report drew on 
agency theory to identify critical relationships that, 
they argued, provide space and incentives for corrup-
tion in the sector.45 This was a significant innovation in 
health economics—where agency theory had been used 
to analyse inefficiencies for the first time. Two critical 
elements of the principal agent relationship were consid-
ered important in facilitating corruption.
‘asymmetric information leads to a series of problems that 
are usefully analysed within the framework of ‘principal—
agent’ relationships. In such a framework, the ‘principal’ 
hires an ‘agent’ to perform some function. When the agent 
has interests that differ from those of the principal and 
when the principal cannot get complete information about 
the agent’s output, it is difficult to find contracts that are 
optimal.’ (Savedoff and Husseman 2006)
The authors recognised that forms of corruption 
differ between different types of health system, but their 
analytical model identified five main actors (regulators, 
payers, healthcare providers, suppliers and consumers/
patients) present in all systems and two characteristics 
of principal–agent relations (diverging interests and 
informational asymmetry) that shape corruption across 
the world. According to them, all systems are vulner-
able due to the uncertainties intrinsic in ill health and 
healthcare (in terms of when and who becomes ill 
and what treatments are likely to work) and the large 
numbers of dispersed actors working in the sector. For 
them, the only possibly response to corruption is a mix 
of accountability and transparency measures that would 
enable corruption to be ‘seen’ but their framework lacks 
a means to identify who would be able and motivated act 
on corruption. They are clear, however, that the amelio-
ration of these agency problems can only come about 
with measures introduced across the whole sector and 
policy measures that will strengthen legal and regulatory 
frameworks.
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Lewis’s paper also draws on agency theory but she 
broadens the analytical scope by considering the appli-
cability of the entire World Bank’s good governance 
framework to service delivery within the health sector.46 
It provides a classic analysis, in which the control of 
corruption is one of six areas that shape governance at 
national level (voice and accountability; political stability 
and lack of violence; government effectiveness; regu-
latory quality; rule of law; and, control of corruption). 
Three are identified as being particularly pertinent to 
service delivery: voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness and control of corruption. For Lewis, the 
focus on corruption comes in part from the lack of data 
on governance and the desire to find a proxy for good 
governance, the logic being that poor governance leads 
to high levels of corruption. Of interest, is the evidence 
that Lewis provides on voice and accountability, which at 
this early stage of anticorruption work in health showed 
a tenuous link to health outcomes—suggesting that citi-
zens were not necessarily very effective in calling bureau-
crats, politicians, and front- line providers to account in 
countries where democratic processes were not firmly 
embedded. Lewis is also circumspect about the potential 
effect of the involvement of communities in overseeing 
service delivery in health:
‘While voice matters in many service delivery instances, its 
role in health seems to be less straightforward. The spe-
cialized nature of medicine, the heterogeneous products 
of the sector and the status of physicians in most societies 
complicates oversight by communities.’ (Lewis 2006:43)
Considering anticorruption, like Savedoff and Haus-
mann, Lewis’ advocates a whole of government approach 
to policy making–an emphasis on what she terms ‘clean 
government’, with the expectation that improvements in 
transparency will curb decision- making space of officials 
and changes in incentive structures will address diverging 
interests and information asymmetry between principals 
and agents. Despite the lack of evidence on its effective-
ness, she maintains that citizens and communities need 
to be involved directly in improving governance.
Vian’s paper, written 2 years later, drew these and on 
other approaches that had emerged in health, together 
with antifraud approaches, to set out the first and still 
dominant health sector- specific framework for under-
standing corruption within health. It combines an 
interest in relationships and individual decision- making 
processes (taken from principal agent theory), with 
good governance frameworks and risk- based models. 
Again, the focus is predominantly at an individual level, 
as she argues ‘corruption is driven by three main forces: 
government agents who abuse public power and posi-
tion for private gain do so because they feel pressured 
to abuse (financially or by clients), because they are able 
to rationalise their behaviour or feel justified (attitudes 
and social norms support their decision) and because 
they have the opportunity to abuse power.’ Her expla-
nation of these opportunities draws extensively on good 
governance models, arguing that the space in which 
corruption may be enacted is influenced by monopoly, 
discretion, accountability, transparency, citizen voice and 
enforcement.47 As with the other two models, transpar-
ency and accountability measures dominate alongside 
whole of sector approaches to anticorruption.
Second phase of corruption in health: from principals and 
agents to politics, social networks and practical norms
By the mid- late 2000s, across many sectors beyond health, 
there was growing disquiet that the basket of interven-
tions that were being pursued by the World Bank, 
national governments, and bilateral development agen-
cies were yielding very poor results.48–50
Researchers in other fields revisited the theory under-
pinning practice and several critiques of blind spots in 
principal agent theory and associated good governance 
models emerged (see reference 51 for a discussion of 
these), of which three are important for health. The 
first is that principal agent theory fails to consider the 
complexity and fluidity of relationships. In the health 
system, at different moments, the principal may be the 
state, the citizen or even health workers who may wish 
to call their managers or ministers to account (when, 
eg, medicines are scarce and commodities do not arrive 
in facilities). Second, while good governance interven-
tions were logical and normatively appealing, very little 
work was given over to understanding how power and 
its distribution between individuals and among groups 
shaped governance: social, political and/or economic 
contexts in which corruption unfolded was not consid-
ered.37 48 52 53 Instead, the idea was that once better infor-
mation was provided (through mechanisms promoting 
transparency) then asymmetry would disappear but in 
the context of developing countries where corruption 
is widespread, information asymmetry is often nested in 
deeper, structural asymmetries of power. The third point, 
closely related to the second, is that in places where 
corruption is endemic, it seemed likely that corruption 
(and anticorruption) was a form of collective rather 
than individual practice—associated with networks and 
groups, informal rules and organisations.50 52
Within health, two sets of new studies that focused on the 
relational nature of corruption demonstrated the need for 
theory that could make sense of the social nature of corrup-
tion and its complexity. The first set came from ethnographic 
accounts that focused more generally on African bureau-
cracies.11 In these, rather than being created through the 
actions of unregulated, individual agents acting in their own 
self- interest, rule breaking and corruption among African 
bureaucrats and front- line service providers emerges as part 
of a system of generalised informality. According to these 
accounts, corruption does not emerge from a ‘lack’ (of 
accountability, transparency, voice, etc) and ungoverned 
spaces. These ethnographic studies show how corrupt prac-
tice emerges in places where social and economic logics 
combine with local, sectoral and individual microdynamics 
to create informal rules and ‘tacit codes’ which dominate 
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everyday practice.54 Pluralist systems of regulation domi-
nate55–57 with the dialectic between formal rules and the 
realities of daily practice creating a moral and normative 
ambivalence about corruption among providers and recip-
ients of care.58 59 Within this body of literature, studies of 
health systems show how political patronage determines, 
for example, payment for staff in Uganda.60 Practical norms 
shape who provides and gains access to the material resources 
that the health system offers (medicines, consumables and 
larger equipment) and on what terms, who provides and 
receives treatment, where, when, and how quickly; guiding 
decision making about how to distribute resources in settings 
where their availability never matches the demands made on 
the system.58 61 These accounts also provide an important 
warning for anticorruption researchers, that although 
corruption creates inequalities it is also a form of problem 
solving in adverse settings.
The second, interconnected way in which context has 
been brought into anticorruption research in health has 
been through research that focused on corruption as a 
collective action problem and so looked at the ways in which 
networks of actors were involved in corruption.11 62–64 This 
work is often less detailed than the ethnographic studies but 
nonetheless it usefully shows how networks of actors rather 
than isolated individuals are implicated in corruption within 
health systems.65 These complex, interconnected social 
and professional networks effectively constitute a second, 
informal system of exchange through which scarce resources 
(including access to services and medicines) are distrib-
uted.65 66 These are structured by informal but systematic 
patterns of rules which have different forms and qualities 
in different settings. They may draw on political or kin- 
based ties, or be formed of looser social relationships that 
can stretch across sectors and different types of street- level 
bureaucrats (teachers, social workers, health workers) so that 
resources from the education section (access to schools) may 
be traded with those from the health sector (more timely 
access to health workers).63 In places in which petty corrup-
tion is commonplace, these broader networks are often 
found, with more highly concealed and closed networks 
often emerging in countries where petty corruption is not 
tolerated.66
These bodies of work provide thick descriptions of corrup-
tion and demonstrate how any model or framework must 
account for the ways in which historical, social and economic 
factors do much more than create rationalisations for corrup-
tion (as suggested in Vian’s model). Instead these factors are 
embedded in the form that corruption takes and must be 
reflected in the design of anticorruption practice. They chal-
lenge the models for action as set out by Savedoff, Lewis and 
Vian, but beyond demonstrating that informality must be 
taken seriously, they provide little guidance on how this can 
be done. The question that many health systems researchers 
ask remains pertinent—how do we transform anticorruption 
practice so that it can factor these insights about informality, 
socioeconomic context and power into anticorruption 
theory and practice?
DEVELOPMENTAL GOVERNANCE: NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 
APPROACHES TO ANTICORRUPTION INTERVENTIONS
Although they rarely focus on health policy and practice, 
debates within development studies on the long- term polit-
ical drivers of social and economic change38 67–69 offer an 
important starting point from which anticorruption practice 
can shift away from principal agent theory and ideas of good 
governance. Of these, Khan’s idea of ‘developmental govern-
ance’ offers the most theoretically developed approach to 
anticorruption.70 Like others, Khan is highly critical of good 
governance and the way in which it benchmarks progress 
across the world against Euro- American countries. Khan 
questions the fundamental assumption within the good 
governance framework: that it was enhancements in the rule 
of law, the protection of property rights and contract law 
that created the conditions through which highly productive 
capitalist economies emerged (see ref. 71 for a description of 
key Good Governance arguments). Reminding readers that 
the early stages of colonisation were devastatingly damaging 
for indigenous people, he argues that the evidence for 
Acemoglu et al’s influential thesis that settler (as opposed 
to extractive) colonisation lead to well- protected property 
rights and therefore economic development is scant72 73 . 
Instead, drawing on the example of the Enclosures of the 
16th century, Khan argues that the capitalist transitions that 
underpinned high economic growth have never relied on 
‘good governance’ mechanisms and have been anything 
but rule following. Similar examples can be made out of the 
history of oligopolistic chartered companies in 18th century 
in England and America’s infamous Gilded Age in the late 
19th century. In countries that were colonised, the social 
re- engineering further complicated the already conflictual 
process of economic and social development.74 75 Policies 
which view high- income country institutions as a standard 
against which others should be judged ignores both the 
history of economic transitions but also colonial histories. 
While he argues, therefore, that good governance is essen-
tially based on a fallacy, Khan does agree that governance 
matters for economic development. Presenting data from 
South Korea and Taiwan, he argues that the transformation 
of these economies has come about because they had govern-
ance capabilities that could address critical and specific 
growth- constraining characteristics (rather than first try and 
enforce rule of law and ensure impartial enforcement).70 74
These historical insights are important to understand 
because they create the basis for substantial shifts in the types 
of anticorruption reforms that are expected to yield results. 
Where good governance sees anticorruption measures 
as one part of wholesale governance improvements that 
needs to occur across sectors (as in Lewis 2006), develop-
mental governance sees targeted anticorruption measures 
as the starting point for governance improvements. Finding 
pockets of change where action is feasible is complex and 
cannot rely on blue- prints or standardised solutions. Because 
they are targeted, anticorruption should only focus on forms 
of corruption that are highly damaging and should leave 
those that have less of an impact or serve as forms of problem 
solving to be resolved at a later date. It also recognises that 
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some forms of corruption are highly damaging and inequi-
table but cannot be overcome without major political trans-
formation. Such systemic political transformations cannot 
for the most part be made through policy change and inter-
vention; and a policy change that destabilises a political 
settlement may have profound unintended consequences 
that could be worse than the corruption itself, increasing 
contestation among powerful parties and potentially leading 
to political violence and conflict.
The research that underpins developmental governance 
approaches to anticorruption has to be detailed and allow 
for a nuanced approach. Here, a health systems approach to 
developmental governance has to expand Khan et al’ model. 
Where they focus primarily on political economy factors that 
shape corruption and the potential for anticorruption inter-
vention,76 health systems and policy research requires a more 
holistic approach that draws in a range of social, cultural and 
health systems factors that drive and shape practice. Baez 
Camargo and colleagues work alongside that of de Sardan 
and colleagues (see above) becomes extremely useful, 
making sense of the local drivers of practice, the forms of 
corruption that are most detrimental to the system and those 
which will be feasible to address through targeted policy 
change. Knowledge of the everyday realities of working in an 
underfunded or fragmented health system; an in- depth anal-
ysis of the informal rules that emerge; the networks in which 
resources are exchanged; the influence of powerful groups 
and organisations who distribute resources and opportuni-
ties informally within health systems.
Khan et al propose four strategies for action: changing 
individual and group incentives; creating policy that recog-
nises and acts on differences between actors usually seen as 
a homogenous; creating forms of collective action among 
groups who are powerful enough to effect anticorruption; 
and rendering the rights of different actors transparent.76 
For health systems, which are often underfunded we have 
added a fifth, targeted anticorruption investments.
CASE STUDY: ABSENTEEISM AMONG DOCTORS IN RURAL 
BANGLADESH
Absenteeism among doctors in Bangladesh fulfils the first 
criterion in Khan et al’s approach (corruption that is highly 
damaging) as it critically undermines access to effective, equi-
table and high- quality care.76 Widespread across the country, 
absenteeism is a particular problem in rural areas. Research 
from 2003 reported 41% of doctors to be absent77 and more 
recent comparisons between urban and rural areas shows a 
doctor, population ratio of 18:10 000 in urban and 1:10 000 in 
rural areas.78 It is further compounded by failures to recruit 
doctors into these positions,79–81 and has recently become an 
important priority for the Bangladesh government.82
To understand how policy, health systems resources and 
constraints combine with political and social networks to 
shape absenteeism among doctors in rural areas, thirty 
in- depth interviews were conducted with doctors about 
their experiences of absenteeism. The majority were junior 
doctors in their rural placements (n=18); five were mid- level 
doctors who had been assigned to a rural position within the 
past 5 years (n=5). We also interviewed seven senior doctors, 
most of whom were in management positions to provide us 
with a view of absenteeism as seen from the top to down.
Patient and public involvement
This research was done without patient involvement. Patients 
were not invited to comment on the study design or inter-
pret the results. Patients were not invited to contribute to the 
writing or editing of this document for readability or accu-
racy.
Findings
From these interviews, we were able to group the doctors 
according to three courses of action. In the first group, which 
was relatively small, were those who were posted to a rural 
facility but either never arrived at the facility or arrived and 
then left shortly afterwards (often described as being there 
for a number of days) never to return. We did not meet any 
doctors who fell into this category. Instead, the actions of this 
group were based on cases described to us by colleagues so 
the processes involved in this form of absenteeism was mostly 
opaque. We often did not know whether the rural posting 
had been cancelled and the absent doctor had managed 
to get an ‘attachment’ or transfer to another health centre. 
In some instances, however, respondents described other 
doctors as being registered as absent for a few months after 
which time their names would disappear from the register 
and the positions would be relisted as unfilled. The second 
group of doctors were (or had been) those who were present 
at a rural facility some of the time but would take quite long 
periods of time (up to several weeks) away from their posts. 
Finally, a third group of doctors, mainly junior doctors who 
very rarely took time away from their positions. They often 
complained bitterly of the difficulty of ever taking leave (eg, 
to attend family occasions) and the difficult and extremely 
hard work that they had to do (in part to cover the work of 
those who were not there but also to cover posts that had not 
been filled).
Explanations of the differences in practice
Incentives and pressures within the health system
The study found few social, professional or economic incen-
tives for doctors to stay at rural health facilities. Rural post-
ings were described as difficult, stressful and dangerous. Male 
doctors complained of the dangers associated with being 
called out of the health facility and into villages to attend 
cases, especially if two families or factions were in dispute 
about the cause and consequences of an accident. Female 
doctors were also concerned about the lack of security in the 
health facility compounds, the dangers of undertaking night 
shifts because of a lack of security at night and, a complete 
lack of suitable housing either within the compound or 
beyond it (in one instance, in a very remote area). Both male 
and female doctors also described the ways in which local 
residents would put them under pressure to issue false or 
fabricated medical certificates and described verbal abuse 
and theft of their property.
 on F









ealth: first published as 10.1136/bm






Hutchinson E, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003092. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003092 7
BMJ Global Health
Although policies present rural work as part of junior 
doctors’ career progression, all those we interviewed saw 
their time in the rural health centres as a threat to their 
careers and the achievement of a specialist training place-
ment, seen as critical in a health system that affords little 
space for medical generalists. The workload made it difficult 
to find time to study for postgraduation exams necessary 
for entry to a specialist field. The highly competitive exams 
require considerable revision; training courses take place in 
urban settings and demand periods of absence that are not 
always sanctioned.
The influence of social and political networks
While these pressures from within the health system help 
to understand what drives doctors to be absent, it does not 
explain the differences among them: and why it was despite 
widespread dissatisfaction that some left the health facilities 
while others stayed. The explanation of the patterning of this 
absence lies in structures beyond the health system and the 
way in which they influenced the options of rurally posted 
doctors in Bangladesh.
In the first group (the majority being junior doctors), 
those who either arrived and left very quickly or those who 
never arrived at all, were those who were described as closely 
connected to politically powerful and/or, those with very 
strong professional networks, or those whose work could 
be covered by a family member (we encountered two cases 
where husbands, who were also doctors, covered their wives’ 
shifts). The following quotation was from a junior doctor in 
a rural area who was describing a case of absenteeism in her 
current rural health centre. Her discourse shows how it was 
logical to seek to move out of the health centre, if she/he has 
the financial resources.
‘They transferred 2 doctors (husband- wife) here but they 
left after joining and still now they are in the count. I have 
heard that their financial status was good, so they didn’t 
stay here. So, while here the doctor count is 5, ultimately 
[that appears that there is] no shortage of doctors. But, 
actually we are 2 in number to provide patients service.’
Whereas the quotation above points to wealth as a 
means of moving out of the rural placement, another 
junior doctor who described how she had had to pay to 
get a placement closer to her family and also made clear 
the ways in which those with powerful political and social 
connections did not have to make an unofficial payment 
to move from one health facility to another.
F:…as no one wants to go in places like X so it was not a 
preferred place to get the transfer that’s why the amount 
of unofficial payment [I paid] was also low. I offered only 
2000 BDT. Everyone has to pay the money.
R: What was the cost of posting in X [a better area]?
F: It depends on the networking and the situation. Some 
people don’t need money even. The son of X [a senior pol-
itician] applied to change his posting from [rural health 
centre] to the nearest Institute of Health Technology. Im-
mediately, after his application, staff were instructed to 
search for a vacant position for him and issue the order. 
He was transferred to the nearest location from his house 
from where he can continue [his training].
This case suggests that these forms of corruption are 
quite systematic and embedded within social and polit-
ical structures of Bangladesh. More desirable postings 
cost more in terms of unofficial payments and more 
powerful networks enable doctors to move quickly and 
more cheaply to good quality positions.
Among the second group of doctors, (those who stayed 
at the facilities for a longer period of time but who were 
often absent as they sought new placements) were those 
who had access to political and social networks who could 
help them secure an urban position and who were able 
to pay the necessary unofficial payments as they lobbied 
different members of the civil service to find them. The 
difference between this group and the first is that these 
doctors took longer to move because they had poorer 
access to networks and/or were relatively less well- off so 
had to work much harder to secure a placement beyond 
the health facility and the effectiveness of networks in 
securing these places was not guaranteed. Below, three 
different junior doctors reflect on their own attempts to 
secure an urban placement and how this impacted on the 
time that they spent away from the rural health centre.
‘I tried to talk with different political leaders [to secure] 
my transfer using my social and personal network. I took 
1- month’s leave and again, extended [it] for 21 days to 
manage my posting.’
‘I collected the information of vacant position and men-
tioned the area with position name in my application to 
the authorities at centre level . If you just submit the ap-
plication and sit, your application will not move and you’ll 
not get your expected posting at your selected area. Doc-
tors have to go repeatedly to take the news of the file and 
sometimes have to take appointments and meet them. Giv-
ing money to the peons, clerks and other staffs is also an 
important step of having transfer to a good area.’
‘I have taken forwarding from the head of the respecting 
health facility and submitted it to the divisional director. 
Then, I went to Dhaka for further communication. It 
took total 2 months to complete the process. For those 
two months, I had to go to every table to moving my file 
from one table to another. During this process many peo-
ple have to spend their money [i.e. make an unofficial 
payment] on a regular basis. If anyone spent money, their 
transfer process will be fast compared to others.”
Whereas the powerful politician’s son did not have 
to look for a position himself or lobby for a change in 
posting, in each of these cases, the junior doctors had to 
have direct contact with those either in the bureaucracy 
or with powerful individuals who could influence those 
in the bureaucracy to move away from the rural health 
centre. Moreover, success was not guaranteed even if 
unofficial payments were made and networks were drawn 
on. In one case, a junior doctor who had been placed in 
a rural area with no safe house for her to stay in worked 
hard to get support from her political networks and those 
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of her husband to lobby on her behalf for a new posting. 
She failed to secure enough support get a new posting 
and was left in her rural post in which there was no pros-
pect that she would find secure housing or be able to 
study for a the post graduate examination. Eventually she 
resigned her position and left the profession.
The third group of doctors comprised those who very 
rarely took time away from their positions and who often 
had to work extremely hard to cover the work of those 
who were not there and those positions that had not been 
filled. Among this group, there was a minority of doctors 
who found their positions fulfilling but there was one 
interviewee who, despite the hard work, felt protected 
and valued by his family members who lived nearby. The 
majority, however, wanted to leave the rural area in which 
they worked and find a placement in a town or city where 
they could train for the postgraduation examination. 
Many appeared exhausted and with little enthusiasm for 
their work. With no time to study for the post- graduation 
exam, many also recognised that as they lacked powerful 
political connections or wealthy family members, it 
would be unlikely that they could find a way of doing so. 
One male junior doctor explained that he now regretted 
his failure to become involved in student politics as that 
would have provided him with the networks to support a 
shift to a new position.
‘Due to not having any political linkage or, student life po-
litical involvement, I’m unable to have my posting in Dha-
ka or, around Dhaka. If I [had] known earlier, I would be 
engaged in politics somehow. Some doctors have to stay at 
Rangamati or, Coxs Bazar for 10–15 years, as, they haven’t 
done politics or, haven’t been engaged in the politics.’
Linking the findings back to the frameworks
It is possible to examine these findings from Bangladesh 
through the models based on good governance, principal 
agent theory and risk. The desire for career progression 
and fears of safety could be classified in Vian’s model as a 
rationalisation of corrupt practice; and the opportunities 
to engage in corruption can be related to the fact that the 
Bangladesh health system lacks systems of accountability 
and transparency and limited enforcement of the formal 
rules. Such an interpretation is not wrong, but it leaves crit-
ical blind spots in the analysis and undermines the gener-
ation of a thick description of the context, health worker 
dissatisfaction and the political economy of power relations 
that underpins absenteeism, posting and transfer processes 
in many settings.83–85 It lacks the capacity to understand 
what we might consider a parallel system of accountability86 
and the reasons why, when almost all doctors do not like 
working in rural areas, some stay while others are frequently 
or permanently absent.
Instead, absenteeism appears a form of problem solv-
ing—a means of managing unsafe worksites and threats 
to successful career progression and a commonplace and 
practical response to systemic problems within the health 
system. Camargo’s hypothesis (drawn from collective 
action theory) that it is networks of actors rather than indi-
viduals that are involved in corruption also resonates with 
our findings. In Bangladesh, these appeared to be more 
hierarchically organised networks than those in Tanzania 
and Rwanda that Baez Camargo and Koechlin examined63; 
but as in these African settings, it would be very difficult 
for individuals to step out of the informal system through 
which more desirable placements are distributed.
Once political and social structures are attended to, it is 
possible to take account of the differences between these 
doctors and, as Khan et al suggest, differentiate between 
actors who benefit and those who lose out from this 
informal system of distribution. Doctors are neither indi-
viduals seeking to take advantage of a lack of accountability 
nor are they a homogeneous group caught in a web of actors 
dominated by transactional social relationships. Instead, 
they appear as unequally positioned social agents who draw 
on social and political networks as they compete and coop-
erate for limited material, social and professional resources 
and rewards. Absenteeism is not an option for everyone; 
even for those who can use networks and afford to make 
unofficial payments, success is not guaranteed. The process 
is both difficult and costly to navigate. It seems likely that 
broader health systems investments, making improvements 
in terms of safety for health workers in rural areas, inter-
ventions to reshape incentives around career progression 
and create new forms of collective action the basis through 
which absenteeism could be tackled in Bangladesh.
CONCLUSION
The health sector faces particular challenges from corrup-
tion.45 Forms of corruption—informal payments, absen-
teeism, medicine theft, fraud and purchasing positions—
can be found in health systems across the world.25 87–89 The 
effects of these activities are often greatest at the facility 
level during patient encounters, as providers shape what 
care is available to the population.
In health, anticorruption research continues to be domi-
nated by frameworks that rely on neoclassical economic 
formulations of behaviour change, a focus on formal, 
technical fixes (government policy; and the need for insti-
tutional and organisational reform) that ignore the social 
and political context. Corruption is seen to emerge from 
ungoverned or poorly governed spaces in which profit 
maximising opportunists who seek to exploit weaknesses 
in the system are able to do so and those who do not are 
framed as more moral actors. New frameworks take account 
of the broader context of the health system and realities 
of the social, political and economic structures. They must 
take note of the considerable and growing critique of the 
techno- managerial approaches to public health and the 
evidence that demonstrates that informal practice, politics 
and political economy shape and often dominate prac-
tice. Incorporating developmental governance into health 
systems research and policy research provides new possi-
bilities for research- driven intervention through which 
we can develop Gaitonde’s proposal for ‘locally tailored 
interventions born from a deeper understanding of local 
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dynamics rather than focus on solutions that are universal 
or up- scalable’.14
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